has been vanquished they will depart quit of the appeal by judgment, for where  there is no principal there is no accessory,1 nor ought counsel to be harmful when  the wrongful act is without effect,2 nor ought they3 to answer the other appellors  for the same deed for which he has once made his defence against one.4
If the person appealed as principal is vanquished let proceedings then first be taken against accessories and instigators.
 If the appellee has been vanquished those appealed as accessories and instigators  are then first bound to answer,5 and will no longer be replegiable, for when the  principal is convicted it may then be presumed that there were accessories and  instigators. Let them therefore answer on the same day, and let the duel be waged  on that day between the first appellor and the [first] accessory or instigator,  according to the order in which they are placed in the appeal, provided that the  accessory comes first and the instigator later, because giving assistance in whatever  way involves an act which instigating does not. But why cannot the other  appellors, those other than the first and chief appellor, putting him aside, join the  duel with those appealed as accessories and instigators? [The reason],6 so it seems,  is this: giving assistance and instigating are (so to speak) the accompaniments of  the principal deed and are so conjoined and connected with it that they are not  separable [and may not be pursued by different persons],7 for the wound, the  assistance and the instigation together form a single deed: there would be no  wound had there been no assistance, and neither wound nor assistance without the  instigation.
Where several appeal one for a death resulting from several wounds.
 It sometimes happens that several appeal one of another's death resulting from  several deeds and different mortal wounds, [there are then several different appeals  because of the number of deeds, and hence each may appeal the one as principal of  one mortal wound and several others as accessories8 and instigators,]9for an  appellor other than the first may appeal him of a second mortal wound and a second  deed in the same way as the first, and so in order, with respect to different wounds,  a third of a third, and a fourth of a fourth10 and so on. [Enough has been said of the  words of the appeal.] But since the appellee cannot answer all the appellors at one  and the same time, though he is bound to answer them all as principal, he must  therefore answer one first and the others afterwards, in turn successively. Let him  therefore answer A. who is the first.