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[001] right. But once the second disseisor begins to have a quasi-[free] tenement, as was
[002] said above,1 because of the negligence of the first disseisor, if he is ejected without
[003] judgment, whether by the true lord or the first disseisor, he will recover seisin despite
[004] the exception of free tenement. Thus it is evident from the foregoing that though the
[005] exception of free tenement may sometimes lie against a plaintiff, it is not everyone
[006] who may put it forward, no more than anyone may put forward the exception of
[007] bastardy or villeinage when they lie, as was said above.2 And though a replication
[008] sometimes lies against an exception, it is not everyone who may put that forward,
[009] as may be seen where a husband has enfeoffed another of his wife's property, and
[010] after the husband's death the wife claims by writ of entry; if it is excepted against
[011] her that the gift was made by her and her husband, she may replicate that she could
[012] not gainsay her husband, and she will thus recover. But if after her death it is the heir
[013] out of seisin who claims by a similar writ of entry, it will not lie for him, because the
[014] replication which lay for his mother does not lie for him, as where he claims and the
[015] gift is excepted against him, he cannot replicate as his mother could if she were alive,
[016] because, in as much as it is [not] said in the writ ‘and whom my mother could not
[017] gainsay,’ it is evident that such replication lies3 for the mother, not the heir, [as may
[018] be seen below in the tractate on entries.]4

If the disseisee, after a long interval, usurps his own seisin on his own authority and without judgment.


[020] Let us see the penalty that falls upon those who, after allowing time to pass, usurp
[021] their own seisin by force and without judgment. [In an action of spoliation5 the intruder
[022] or disseisor must be restored, despite any exception of property. The exception
[023] of property by the true lord ought not to bar [him], as where he says, ‘I disseised you
[024] rightfully because it is my tenement and I am its lord, and you can have no free tenement
[025] because you have no entry except by intrusion or disseisin.’ That exception will
[026] not avail him [because] though he puts himself in seisin rightfully from the point of
[027] view of right, he does so wrongfully since without judgment, as was said above.6 For
[028] force must be dealt with before property.7 And so if villeinage is excepted, force must
[029] be dealt with before status, as where he raises the exception of villeinage [who] has
[030] no right in the body of the villein, as above more fully [in the portion] on the exception
[031] of villeinage.8 Reason also accords with this, as where 9it is objected against a named
[032] heir that the testament is a forgery or inofficious, or that the testator was a slave; the
[033] scriptus heres ought to be put in possession nonetheless,10 nor



Notes

1. Supra 54, 133

2. Supra 87

3. ‘competit’

4. Infra iv, 33

5. ‘In causa spolicationis,’ from precedingline

6. Supra 121, 133, 134

7. D.5.1.37; D.48.6.5.1; ‘ante cognoscendum de vi quam de proprietate rei’; 48.6.5.1: supra ii, 320

8. Supra 86

9-10. C. 6.33.2: ‘Quamvis quis se filium defuncti praeteritum esse adleget aut falsum vel inofficiosum testamentum seu alio vitio subiectum vel servus defunctus esse dicatur, tamen scriptus heres in possessionem mitti solet.’; Barton in Tulane L. Rev., xlii, 572


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