the matter otherwise than it happened, they either do so wittingly or are led astray  by reasonable error. If having been examined (when they are led astray by reasonable  error) they amend their statement, they may well do so, with impunity before  judgment, but after judgment not without penalty.1 If they persist in falsehood and  wittingly speak what is false, and cannot be convicted out of their own mouths  before judgment, they may be convicted after judgment by a jury. The judge or  justice may be at fault and not the juror, as where, though the juror has spoken the  truth and given the reason for his statement, the justice decides to the contrary; he  either does this wittingly, in which case he will be liable ex maleficio, for deciding  wrongly and wittingly perverting the just judgment of the jurors, and thus not the  jurors but the justice will be at fault, [or unwittingly, as] where he acts through  ignorance or inexperience, [in which case] he will be liable quasi ex maleficio;2  because of his inexperience, he is to be dealt with more leniently with respect to  punishment. 3The record having been examined, as aforesaid, let a conviction either  be allowed at once or absolutely refused. Suppose that the jurors, being inadequately  examined, speak obscurely, or do not reply fully to the interrogatories, or uncertainly,  or, led astray by reasonable error do not speak the truth, as to part or the  whole; then, the record having been examined, as above, certification rather than  conviction will be appropriate, that they may make certainty out of uncertainty,  truth out of doubt, and be recalled from error to truth.4
Who ought to take a conviction and a certification.
 When a certification is sought, [It ought not to be easily granted before someone  other than the judge who took the assise, unless there is some ground for suspicion.]5  it may not be granted before the record is seen and examined, as remarked above,  [of conviction.] If the record is sufficient and clear, there will be no need for certification,6  since the jurors cannot change their record or verdict nor vary in their  verdict from the record of the justices, for if they could their word would thus be  preferred and the record would be worthless. If they speak contrary to the record,  they convict themselves by their own mouths. They can, however, in certification,  make good a defect, as where they have said too little or something obscure, either  in the narration of fact or in the judgment. If led astray by honest error they have  sworn a foolish oath,7 they may correct their verdict before judgment with impunity,  but after judgment not without penalty; though they put8 themselves in the mercy  of the lord king, they will not escape the penalty for perjury, that is, with respect to  redemption, though they are not adjudged infamous, as in the case