whether it was impetrated against predecessors, abbots or priors, under the name of  the dignity only, or both under his proper name and the name of the dignity.1 If  under his proper name, then whether the predecessor and successor have the same  name or different ones, [as will be explained more fully below.]2 And generally,  whichever one of them dies, he who did the act or he in whose name it was done,  though he avows, the writ and the assise fall and another writ will be necessary.
To whom the plaint ought to be made.
 It was explained above to whom the plaint of disseisin belongs and to whom it does  not. We must now explain to whom it ought to be made and to whom recourse must  be had when the disseisee has lost both natural possession and civil, since he may not  regain seisin by his own authority when he has once lost it. The plaint ought to be  made to him who has jurisdiction, as the prince, and not to everyone who has jurisdiction  unless he also has coertion, so that he may order execution of his judgment.3 Not  to an archbishop or a bishop or other [ecclesiastics], though they have jurisdiction  in some matters, [because] they have neither cognisance nor coertion with respect  to lay fee, for if an archbishop or bishop or other ecclesiastic should take cognisance  of lay fee and judge with respect to it, and if that judgment were executed by them,  the assise of novel disseisin would lie against them, because, though judgment has  been rendered and though it is entirely just, nevertheless, since he had neither  jurisdiction nor coertion in such matters, it would be of no value. If he demanded  execution [of the sheriff], the sheriff would disobey them with impunity; if he executed  it, he would fall into the assise with the others. But may not an ecclesiastical  judge take cognisance of lay fee by reason of pledge of faith? No, because if he did  he would have neither coertion nor execution of judgment, and though cognisance  is taken of pledge of faith in the ecclesiastical court, because of that jurisdiction or  cognisance of the principal matter, that is, of the lay fee, is not changed, [that is],  because of something incident to the principal, that is, the pledge of faith; nor ought  that which is primary and of greater importance to be drawn to another's, that is,4 a  forbidden forum because of that which is of lesser importance and secondary,  incident to the principal or arising out of it.5 Just as, conversely, by what is of lesser  importance and secondary, there ought not to be drawn to the secular6 forum that  which is of primary and principal importance in the ecclesiastical forum, as where  money is promised because of a matrimonial causa; though it seems at first sight that  cognisance over chattels and debts belongs to the secular6 forum, nevertheless,  because of that which is greater and more worthy, [the marriage], cognisance of the  money promised and the debt is drawn to the ecclesiastical forum, where no prohibition  lies