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[001] of the plaintiff, why he cannot bring the assise, or the person of the tenant, why he
[002] cannot except against the assise, or against the writ,1 that because of error it cannot
[003] stand, or answer as they are enjoined,2 only to matters which pertain to the assise.
[004] If they speak with certainty of matters which pertain to the assise, then what they
[005] say is either true or false. If true, their verdict will stand, nor is a conviction to be
[006] feared. If false, then it is either witting or unwitting. If witting, they commit perjury.
[007] If unwitting, as where they have been led into some reasonable error, they are
[008] excused as a matter of grace. If they speak obscurely the judge ought to examine,
[009] that he may draw certainty from uncertainty, light out of darkness, truth from
[010] credulity,3 otherwise their oath will be perilous and dangerous and a foolish judgment
[011] may follow therefrom.4 If the jurors are completely ignorant of the facts and
[012] know nothing of the truth, let others be associated with them who do know it. But
[013] if the truth cannot even then be ascertained, it will then be necessary to speak from
[014] belief and conscience at the least. They do not then commit perjury, because they
[015] do not act contrary to conscience,5 as will be explained more fully below [in the
[016] portion] on convictions.6 If they speak against the person of the plaintiff, that7 the
[017] assise is not available to him, or against the tenant, that he cannot except, and speak
[018] falsely, they commit perjury and lay themselves open to a conviction, because the
[019] assise is taken in the manner of an assise, though that would not be so if it were taken
[020] as a jury, if such exceptions,8 namely, causa, status, agreement or condition and the
[021] like, had been raised by one party against the other, and both of their own accord
[022] had put themselves on a jury, since they had no other proof. If the jurors say that
[023] the writ is ineptly drawn, because there is error in the names of the counties,9 [or]
[024] vills, in the names of persons or their surnames, or even in the names of dignities and
[025] the like, this will not be of much importance, because the matter was not raised by
[026] the tenant at the outset, by excepting, [With respect to the names of counties10
[027] and vills, [error] does not matter provided the place is clear; nor is it important with
[028] respect to the names of persons, as long as it is clear which persons are meant.]11
[029] and12 since he immediately put himself on the assise, ignoring the error, he approved
[030] the writ as valid. And though the jurors err in this matter they do not commit perjury,
[031] since they do not consent to the falsehood, because he who errs does not consent.13
[032] Just as most diligent examination is the task of the judge,14 so the just delivery
[033] of judgment falls to him. But before judgment he ought to examine the facts and
[034] the verdicts of the jurors so that he may proceed to judgment with security, since
[035] jus15 has three associates, namely, truth, justice and judgment: truth is to be found
[036] in the juror, justice and



Notes

1. ‘contra breve,’ from line 5; om: ‘et non’

2. ‘secundum quod eis iniunguntur ad ea quae’

3. Supra ii, 303

4. Infra 75

5. Supra 63

6. Infra 336

7. ‘quod’

8. ‘exceptiones’

9. ‘comitatuum,’ as below

10. ‘nominibus vero comitatuum’

11. Infra 81

12. Om: ‘quia tenens . . . excepit,’ a connective

13. Supra 63, infra 337

14. Supra ii, 302-3, iii, 68

15. ‘ius’


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