that the lord king and his council were deceived by a false suggestion. For the king  may be deceived since he is a man, but God can never be since he is God. [If], when  the lord king has been apprised of this, he persists in his intention to protect the  tenant, though the injuria from then on it will be the injuria of the king himself,1  since he is bound to dispense2 justice to all men, there is no one who can impose the  necessity of correcting or amending it upon him unless he himself so wishes, since  he has no superior except God, and it will suffice him for punishment that he await  God's vengeance.3 If he imposes the necessity of rendering judgment upon his justices  in this case or others like it, let them render4 it in this way, that it is not by  judgment5 but because the lord king so wishes, whence it follows that the judgment  is a matter of will rather than jus,6 if it can be called a judgment.7 And whatever  may be said of the king's deed, that he is king and accordingly his deed must not  be questioned,8 it may not be judged nor revoked by anyone when it is rightful, but  if it is wrongful it will not then be the deed of the king.9 And since it is not his deed,  because wrongful, it may be questioned and judged, but it cannot be amended or  revoked without him.]10 And note in conclusion that contumacy and default may be  excused in the absence of necessity, by will alone, since one summoned by one not  his proper judge is not bound to appear.11 He is excused of default before judgment  and after, when that is proved, and so if the matter proceeds [to] judgment through  a false procurator, because with one not his proper judge or an unauthorized procurator  the judgment is void and the controversy void.12 And so when he has no  summons or an improper summons, [He need not then appear to answer the plea,  only to allege and prove that the summons was void or improper.]13 And so if he  has gone on a journey before the summons, not anticipated by the summons, as was  said above.
If after default a love-day is taken.
 And finally note that if after default and before judgment a love-day is taken, [or  the plea is transferred from one court to another at the instance and the prayer of  the demandant, who stood to gain by the default, and it is done simply, without  mention of the default, it is evident that the demandant tacitly renounces the  default, and therefore he will have no