the said D. says that he does not wish to answer to the said B. and C. without the  aforesaid A. And have etc. Witness etc. If A. does not appear on that day, let B.  and C. proceed as to their part, if they wish. And what is said of one may be said  of several, if they wish to sue. But what of one parcener and co-heir who claims his  portion against his parceners and co-heirs when he has nothing and the others hold  the whole? According as the thing is partible by reason of the thing only or of the  thing and the persons, he may have this writ of purparty against his parceners and  claim his portion, which action is called mixed. Let him thus sue for his portion  because neither the assise of mortdancestor nor any other action lies, only the  action of purparty which determines and divides the right among co-heirs, because  the mere right descends to each of the parceners immediately, in the moment after  the death of the ancestor, which would not be true of other co-heirs, who, though  they are co-heirs, are not capable of inheriting a portion,1 since the entire mere  right descends only to one of the several when the inheritance does not admit of  partition or division among co-heirs. One is therefore always preferred to all the  others, since he is a nearer heir, for many reasons, as above.2 Since in this mixed  action there are several who hold, whether one or several claim, no one of those  who are tenants will answer without the others, because of the contribution. If  there are several who claim against parceners, each ought to claim by himself, not  in common with his parcener demandant, because neither of them claims anything  except his reasonable share.
If a husband and wife claim and one defaults.
 If a husband and wife claim the wife's property they cannot be called parceners,  for the reason above, and [thus] the default of one will be prejudicial to both,  whether they hold or claim.3 If they are tenants and the land is taken into the  king's hand for the default of both or one, so that there ought to be a judgment of  default, if the woman says that her husband is dead, though she does not have  proof or suit at hand, the judgment will remain in suspense until the truth is ascertained,  and a day will be given both of them, that the wife may then prove his death  and the demandant that he is alive, as [in the roll] of the eyre of the abbot of  Reading and Martin of Pateshull in the counties of Surrey and Leicester, [the case]  of Hugh son of William.4 But why is recourse had to two proofs when one would  suffice? Because when the wife says her husband is dead, from that protestation  only a slight presumption arises, and if it is not at once