vouches C. to warranty, and C. when he comes by the summons, before he has  warranted or after, claims the view; he will not have it because the warrantor is  bound to answer to his charter, or those of his ancestors, in which the land claimed  is specified. And even if the tenant has no charters, the warrantor knows or ought  to know what land the tenant holds of him, and from what land he took the homage  and service of him who vouched him to warranty, and when he warrants, by judgment  or in another way, he ought to know of what land he was vouched to warranty,  of what kind and of how much. The same will be done in the case of several  warrantors, no one of whom will have the view until the plea has come to the duel,  if the duel is waged. Then, after the duel waged and the gages accepted, let the view  be made to the champions. And because there has been no view in the whole plea,  let them be told to view that land before the day given them; this is for the oath,  which they will take de visu suo, as may be seen below [in the portion] on the  oaths of champions.1 The view does not lie after the land has once been seized into  the king's hand by default, because the equivalent suffices, because the demandant  must designate to the viewers the kind and quantity of land, what and how much  he claims and by what metes, and when it has so been seized, it ought to be claimed  by replevin in the same way and in the same quantity, which suffices for the view.  But the view is sometimes granted after default out of abundant caution, for the  oath of the champions, as [in the roll] of Trinity term in the fourth year of king  Henry.2
If after the view claimed the tenant essoins himself and afterwards says he has not had the view.
 View is sometimes denied, as where, [after] it is once granted and, before the tenant  has had it, he causes himself to be essoined on his day, since he ought to have complained  that he had not had the view, as is done with respect to summonses, when  one essoins himself where he ought to have challenged the writ of summons.3
Whether the view lies for incorporeal things, as rights.
 We have explained above where the view does not lie for corporeal things which  may be seen and touched, and the reason why. Now we must see whether the view
1. Not dealt with in treatise; a portion on the litis contestatio may have once existed
2. B.N.B., no. 1436 (in margin: Magnum recordum et bonum); C.R.R., ix, 132 (marked De recto)