The exception arising from the delict of spoliation, until he has been restored.
 A dilatory exception arising from the person of the demandant lies for the tenant ex  delicto, as where the tenant has been despoiled by the demandant and not restored, in  whole or in part; the tenant will not reply until restitution has been made, because  we ought not to fight naked nor oppose our enemies unarmed, nor is one taken to be  restored who has not been restored completely, just as a thing is not taken to be  restored which is restored damaged, as may be seen above [in the portion] on  spoliations, of1 disseisins and restitutions.
A dilatory exception because the right is common, so that he cannot answer without another, or because the matter touches others without whom etc.
 A peremptory exception, sometimes a dilatory exception, arising from the person  of someone other than the demandant also lies for a tenant, because the demandant  cannot sue without the other, who has as much right as he who claims, as [where]  there are several parceners, or because he has no right without another, as a husband  without his wife with respect to his wife's property, or because2 a wife cannot sue  without her husband with respect to her own property, since her husband, conjoined  to her, is the head of his wife, or because it is not the demandant but another who has  the action, who3 can bring the thing into court, as simple canons or monks or those  who are removable, without their abbot or prior. Also a dean and chapter without  their bishop. And so if the demandant has right, since he is a rightful and near coheir,  but another has a greater right because he is nearer, as may be seen above in the  tractate on the assise of mortdancestor.4
The exception that he has parceners without whom etc.
 We must first explain the exception which lies for the tenant because parceners who  have as much right [as the demandant] are not named in the writ.5 Several parceners  are, so to speak, a single body, in as much as they have a single right, and the body  must be complete, not defective in some part. Parceners are, so to speak, takers of  part, capable of inheriting part, [as above [in the portion] on the nature of heirs and  differences between them,]6 because the thing is common among them by reason of  the several persons, or by reason of vicinage or by reason of the thing itself, which is  partible, and not by reason of the persons, who7 are not, so to speak, a single heir and  a single body, but separate heirs, where the tenement