by C. and D. Judgment. Let him be put by better pledges to appear on such a day,  and let the first pledges etc. The form of the writ is as follows.
Writ for attaching by better pledges.
 The king to the sheriff, greeting. Put B. of N. by gage and better pledges to be before  our justices etc. to answer A. with respect to a plea etc. (according to the form of the  original writ) and to show why he did not appear before the same justices etc. on such  a day, as he was attached. And summon by good summoners C. and D., the first  pledges of the same1 B., to be before the same justices at the aforesaid term to hear  their judgment as to this, that they did not have the aforesaid B. in our same court  before our same justices as they pledged him. And have there the names of the second  pledges and this writ. If the reus does not come on that day, nor the pledges to show  why they did not have the aforesaid reus, they will all be in mercy, but not the reus  until he appears, because [when] pledges fail him, all the defaults then first begin [to  be] his own, as though he had never found pledges, as may be seen at the end of the  following writ, where it is said that he be present to hear his judgment as to his several  defaults, and from this day all afforcements of pledges will cease.
How and when pledges are to be amerced.
 If the reus appears2 after the second attachment, only the first pledges, are to be  amerced, unless they come and show why they did not have him at the first attachment,  not the second pledges [unless] at the second3 attachment they do not come  and do not have the reus. And that all the pledges are to be amerced,4 but not the  reus until he has been summoned to hear his judgment for his several defaults, is  proved in the roll of Michaelmas term in the ninth and the beginning of the tenth  years of king Henry in the county of York [the case] of Nicholas de Stuteville.5 It is  otherwise, as is evident, if one finds pledges for prosecuting and does not prosecute;  all will be in mercy, both pledges and principals. But in truth the cases are not similar,  for in this last all are guilty of culpa; the plaintiff because he does not prosecute and  the pledges because he did not prosecute as they had pledged him, and because they  are pledges for doing, promising the act of another,6 and the others in the first case  bind themselves only to have him on the day of summons. If